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COPYRIGHT MISUSE AS A DEFENSE IN AN
INFRINGEMENT ACTION: LASERCOMB AMERICA,
INC. V. REYNOLDS
In an action by a copyright owner against an infringer,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized the doctrine
of copyright misuse as an affirmative defense to infringement. 2 As a defense
in an infringement action,3 an infringer, according to some courts, may
assert that the copyright owner has misused the owner's copyright either by
extending the copyright owner's limited monopoly beyond the intended
scope of the copyright grant or, in a narrower context, by violating the
antitrust laws.4 This theory of copyright misuse as a defense is similar to
an unclean hands approach in that a court will bar a copyright owner from
enforcing his rights against an infringer due to the copyright owner's
misconduct.5 An unclean hands defense, however, differs from a copyright
misuse defense in that the former requires a showing that the plaintiff's
actions relate directly to the merits of the controversy, 6 and the copyright
misuse defense only requires a showing that the plaintiff's misconduct
generally has undermined public policy.
7
Though the idea of copyright misuse as a defense is not new, the Fourth
Circuit is the first appellate court expressly to apply copyright misuse to
bar relief in an infringement acion.1 The Fourth Circuit's decision in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds provokes the question of whether
prior case law actually supports a copyright misuse defense. 0 Furthermore,
if Lasercomb correctly recognized a copyright misuse defense, the issue
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) (defining "infringer"). Section 501(a) provides that:
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided
by sections 106 through 118 [of title 17], or who imports copies or phonorecords
into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright.
Id.
2. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's recognition
of copyright misuse as affirmative defense to infringement).
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-511 (1988) (defining copyright infringement and remedies for
infringement).
4. See infra notes 74-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which copyright
misuse defense has arisen).
5. See 3 M. Nnmm & D. NnfaraR, NnameR ON COPYRIGHT § 13.09[A]-[B] (1989)
(discussing copyright misuse defense and "unclean hands" defense).
6. See id. at § 13.09[B] (stating that plaintiff's action must actually harm defendant in
order for defendant to assert "unclean hands" defense).
7. See infra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that applicability of copyright
misuse defense should depend on whether plaintiff violated public policy of benefiting public).
8. See infra notes 130-62 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), barring plaintiff's
infringement action because plaintiff's actions constituted copyright misuse notwithstanding
absence of antitrust violation).
9. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
10. See infra notes 44-129 and accompanying text (discussing prior case law).
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remains whether the scope of the defense should be as broad as Lasercomb
suggests." In other words, should courts recognize copyright misuse as an
affirmative defense in an infringement action, and, if so, what constitutes
copyright misuse? 2 These questions are not new,"3 but Lasercomb has finally
provided solid support at the appellate level for the argument that the
copyright misuse doctrine, in fact, does exist. Furthermore, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in Lasercomb supports the argument that a finding of
copyright misuse should rest primarily on the public policy of copyright
law rather than on antitrust standards.' 4
Various courts and commentators have discussed the defense of copy-
right misuse,s but few courts have applied the doctrine to bar an infringe-
ment action.' 6 The copyright misuse doctrine finds support in the analogous
11. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application
of broad standard in which key question is whether copyright owner's conduct has subverted
public policy embodied in copyright).
12. See infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (defining misuse by public policy
standard and stating that conduct need not rise to level of antitrust violation in order to
constitute copyright misuse).
13. See infra note 15 (citing courts and commentators that have discussed copyright
misuse defense).
14. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978-979 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding explicitly that copyright misuse is valid defense and stating that finding of misuse
depends on whether copyright owner subverted public policy and not on whether copyright
owner violated antitrust law).
15. See generally Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-973 (4th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that copyright misuse is valid defense in infringement action); United Tel.
Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that copyright
misuse may be defense in infringement action); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop,
214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 413 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) (same); National Cable Television Ass'n v. Broadcast
Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 652 (D.D.C. 1991) (same); Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F.
Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom
Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v.
Fronteer Directory Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1968, 1972 (D. Minn. 1987) (same); United Artists
Associated, Inc. v. NWL Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (same); M. Witmark
& Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948) (same); Fine, Misuse and Antitrust
Defenses to Copyright Infringement Actions, 17 HAsTnwos L.J. 315 (1965) (discussing copyright
misuse as defense to copyright infringement); Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Waiting
for the Other Shoe, 23 COPYRIGHT L. Sym'p. (ASCAP) 31 (1973) (same); Menell, An Analysis
of the Scope of the Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. RE,. 1045,
1102-1103 n.302 (1989) (asserting that courts should develop copyright misuse doctrine similar
to patent misuse doctrine); Susman, Tying, Refusals to License, and Copyright Misuse: The
Patent Misuse Model, 36 J. oF THs CoyRriuoT Soc'y oF TaR USA 300 (1989) (discussing
copyright misuse as defense to copyright infringement); Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1291 (1981) (same).
16. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
copyright misuse defense to bar infringement claim); quad. inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 1261, 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (applying copyright misuse defense to bar infringement claim
and citing Lasercomb in arriving at that conclusion); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F.
Supp. 843, 850 (D. Minn. 1948) (applying copyright misuse defense to bar infringement claim);
infra notes 98-116 and accompanying text (discussing various courts' reasons for declining to
apply copyright misuse defense).
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doctrine of patent misuse. 17 The seminal case associated with the patent
misuse defense is Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 8 in which the
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a court of equity should enforce
a patent owner's rights in an infringement action when that patent owner
used the patent to restrain competition in the sale of an unpatented product. 19
In Morton Salt, the plaintiff held a patent on a salt depositing machine.
20
The plaintiff leased these patented machines to canners on the condition
that the canners agree to use only the plaintiff's subsidiary's salt tablets
with the machine.2' The defendant allegedly had infringed the plaintiff's
patent by making and leasing unpatented salt depositing machines.? The
Supreme Court found that the plaintiff used its patent on the salt depositing
machine to develop a monopoly in the salt tablet market. 2 In resolving
Morton Salt, the Supreme Court reasoned that, by using the patent on the
salt depositing machine to develop a monopoly in unpatented salt tablets,
the plaintiff used the patent in a manner not authorized by the patent
grant.2 The Court further asserted that a court's enforcement of a patent
establishes the validity of that patent.? Thus, a court should not enforce a
patent when to do so would establish the patent's validity and, thereby,
assist a patent owner in an improper practice. 26 The Court refused to enforce
the plaintiff patent owner's rights because the plaintiff used the patent in
a manner inconsistent with public policy.27
After the Supreme Court's development of the patent misuse doctrine,
Congress recognized patent misuse in section 271(d) of the Patent Act.28 In
1988, Congress amended section 271(d)29 essentially to limit the application
17. See Fine, supra note 15, at 334-36 (asserting that patent misuse considerations are
applicable in copyright).
18. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
19. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppig'er Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490 (1942).
20. Id. at 489.
21. Id. at 491.
22. Id. at 490-91.
23. Id. at 491.
24. Id. at 491-92.
25. Id. at 493.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 494.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1982). Section 271(d) originally read as follows:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory in-
fringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or
authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; or (3) sought to enforce his patent
rights against infringement or contributory infringement.
Id.
29. See Pub. L. No. 100-703, reprinted in 102 Stat. 4674 (1988) (amending § 271(d))8)).
Pub. L. No. 100-703 stated:
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of the patent misuse defense in tie-in cases ° to a rule-of-reason standard."
Generally, section 271(d) only defines conduct that does not constitute
patent misuse.32 However, section 271(d)(5) vaguely defines the standard for
determining when a tying arrangement33 may constitute patent misuse.34 In
determining whether a tying arrangement constitutes patent misuse, courts
likely will apply a rule-of-reason standard. 3 The thrust of the rule-of-reason
standard is that, after finding that a patent owner has crossed the "market
power threshold, ' 36 a court still may find that a tying arrangement does
not constitute a misuse if the benefits of the tie-in outweigh its anticom-
petitive aspects.
3 7
During discussions of an earlier version of the above amendment to
section 271(d),3s some United States senators expressed doubt as to whether
Section 271(d) of title 35, United States Code, is amended by striking out the period
at the end thereof and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "; (4) refused to
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights
to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to
rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned."
Id. at 4676.
30. See generally Kobak, The New Patent Misuse Law, 71 J. PAT. OFF. & TRaDEMARK
Or. Soc'Y 859 (1989) (analyzing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)); Susman, supra note 15, at 315-320; H.
HovExAM, EcoNoMIcs AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 214 (1985) (defining tying arrangement).
According to Hovenkamp, "[a] tie-in or tying arrangement is a sale or lease of one product
on the condition that the buyer take a second product as well." Id. at 214.
31. See HovNKc~mp, supra note 30, at 124-127 (discussing rule-of-reason analysis in
antitrust). In considering the rule-of-reason, Hovenkamp quotes Justice Stevens's statement
that courts will look at "the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the [challenged]
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed" to determine anticompetitiveness. Id. at 125.
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1-4) (1988) (noting conduct that does not constitute misuse).
33. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 30, at 214 (defining tying arrangement).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988) (stating that court is not to deem patent owner
guilty of patent misuse unless patent owner possesses market power).
35. See Susman, supra note 15, at 319-320 (explaining that legislative history indicates
that section 271(d) employs rule-of-reason type analysis).
36. See 134 CONG. REc. S17147 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
(explaining that Patent Misuse Reform Act establishes market power threshold whereby infringer
must show that patent owner possesses market power before court will consider issue of patent
misuse); 4 D.S. CsUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND
INFRINOEMENT § 19.04 [2] (1990) (noting Senator DeConcini's discussion of market power
threshold, and quoting comments of Senator DeConcini).
37. See 134 CONG. REc. S17147 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
(explaining effects of Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988). According to Senator DeConcini,
the effects of section 271(d)(5) are to replace the per se approach of determining patent misuse
with a rule-of-reason approach, to require a finding of market power before determining a
tying arrangement to be a patent misuse, and to permit a patent owner to justify a tying
arrangement despite presence of market power if benefits of tying arrangement outweigh
anticompetitive aspects. Id.; Cmstum, supra note 36, at § 19.04 [2] (noting that, according to
Senator DeConcini, patent owner may justify tying arrangement even where patent owner
possesses market power).
38. See Susman, supra note 15, at 316-319 (discussing earlier proposed patent amend-
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the copyright misuse doctrine existed and asserted that the passage of patent
misuse legislation would not affect copyright law.39 Furthermore, the stat-
utory copyright law provides no guidance as to whether the copyright misuse
doctrine exists.4 Although the patent misuse defense was originally a judi-
cially created doctrine, Congress subsequently recognized that doctrine by
statutorily defining what is not a patent misuse.4 1 Thus, given the original
lack of statutory authority for the patent misuse doctrine, the copyright
misuse doctrine may also exist, despite the absence of a statute, through
judge-made doctrine. The failure of Congress affirmatively to recognize a
copyright misuse defense or to limit such a defense, regardless of the views
of individual senators, does not resolve the issue of whether the copyright
misuse doctrine actually exists. 42
Because the Supreme Court never has recognized explicitly a copyright
misuse doctrine, confusion exists as to the applicability of a misuse doctrine
to the area of copyright. 43 The Supreme Court, however, implicitly may
ment). Susman notes that Congress considered a patent misuse amendment providing for a
straight antitrust standard. Id. Despite Senate approval, the House of Representatives did not
approve the straight antitrust standard, and, at the end of the legislative session, Congress
approved a narrower standard which is now codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5). Id.
39. See 133 CoNo. REc. S10275 (daily ed. July 21, 1987) (statements of Senators
DeConcini and Hatch) (emphasizing that proposed patent misuse reform should not affect
existing copyright law). In the Senate debate on the predecessor to Pub. L. No. 100-703
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4-5)), the following exchange occurred between Senator
DeConcini and Senator Hatch:
Mr. DeConcini. Title XXIV deals only with patent law-not copyrights or trademarks
or other intellectual property issues. Moreover, the Judiciary Committee has not had
before it any proposal relating to copyright misuse in the 100th Congress, and
therefore we had no pending proposal to address.
Mr. Hatch. I want to be assured that no one draws any negative implication from
the fact that we have not restricted the application of the so-called copyright misuse
doctrine in the same way we limit patent misuse. We do not want anyone to conclude
that by not dealing with copyright misuse Congress has somehow, first recognized
the validity of this little-known doctrine, or second, given it an expanded application
of meaning. Is my understanding correct?
Mr. DeConcini. You are absolutely correct. Our decision not to address copyright
misuse should not be interpreted as even tacit approval of that doctrine, as it now
exists, if it now exists. The so-called copyright misuse doctrine is vague and tenuous;
unlike the doctrine of patent misuse, copyright misuse has little or no support in
case law and probably should be eliminated completely. We certainly would not
want to give any increased vitality to it through our action today on the very
different topic of patent misuse.
Id.
40. See Susman, supra note 15, at 317-319 (indicating that Congress has not adopted
statutory copyright misuse despite early proposal for statutory copyright misuse).
41. See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text (discussing development of patent
misuse in Morton Salt and subsequent congressional adoption of patent misuse statute).
42. See supra note 39 (acknowledging comments of Senator DeConcini and Senator
Hatch that statutory adoption of patent misuse does not affect copyrighf law).
43. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting
that Supreme Court has not formally adopted copyright misuse defense); compare Rural Tel.
1992]
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have accepted the copyright misuse doctrine." Specifically, two Supreme
Court cases involving Sherman Anti-Trust Act violations lend support to
the argument for a copyright misuse doctrine. In the first case, United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,41 the issue was whether certain practices
of the defendants, the copyright owners, constituted antitrust violations.
All but one of the defendant film companies engaged in the practice of
block-booking." The Supreme Court accepted the district court's condem-
nation of block-booking as violative of the principles of antitrust.4 7 The
Court also accepted the district court's reasoning that the enlargement of
the copyright through block-booking was similar to the enlargement of the
patent monopolies in cases such as Morton Salt." In applying a copyright
extension theory, the Paramount Pictures Court noted that the government
confers copyrights to benefit the public. 49 The Court asserted that a copyright
achieves this benefit by rewarding authors for their works and thereby
encouraging authors to contribute to society. 0 According to the Paramount
Pictures court, the benefit to the author is secondary to the benefit to the
public.51 However, if works of higher quality are tied to lesser works,
through means such as block-booking, the copyright owner extends the
monopoly in a manner condemned in similar patent cases and, likewise,
undermines the public policy in granting copyrights.1
2
The Supreme Court provided further support for the theory of copyright
misuse in United States v. Loew's Inc..51 In Loew's, the defendant film
Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987) (rejecting application
of misuse doctrine of Morton Salt to copyright law), aff'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990),
rev'd on other grounds, III S. Ct. 1282 (1991) with M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F.
Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948) (applying copyright misuse defense to bar infringement claim).
44. See Fine, supra note 15, at 322-324 (discussing Loew's and Paramount Pictures as
Supreme Court opinions that may be interpreted as supporting theory of copyright misuse);
Note, supra note 15, at 1304-1306, 1304 n.62 (discussing Loew's, Paramount Pictures, and
BMI v. CBS as Supreme Court cases supporting theory of copyright misuse).
45. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
46. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948). According to
the Paramount Pictures Court, block-booking occurs when a film company conditions the
licensing of one film on an exhibitor's agreement also to take an additional film or group of
films. Id.
47. Id. at 157-58.
48. Id. at 157.
49. Id. at 158.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MiNN. L. Rav. 579, 592 (1985) (stating that Supreme Court regularly reasserts
that, under copyright policy, reward to author is secondary to benefit to public). In addition
to stating the constitutional approach in which public benefit is primary, Brown notes an
alternative "exaltation of authorship" approach. Id. at 589. According to this exaltation of
authorship approach, the author's copyright should be treated as a basic property element.
Id. at 589-591.
52. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 158.
53. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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distributors also engaged in block-booking in offering licenses to television
broadcasters.5 4 The Supreme Court cited certain patent misuse cases"5 that
involved tying arrangements to reason that similar tying arrangements in
the copyright field also constitute antitrust violations.5 6 The Court specifi-
cally cited Morton Salt for the proposition that a patent owner may not
utilize the monopoly power conferred by the patent to extend his monopoly
to unpatented products.5 7 The Loew's Court reasoned that block-booking
compounded the monopoly that the copyright granted in a manner violative
of the antitrust laws.
58
In addition to Paramount Pictures and Loew's, one commentator has
asserted that the Supreme Court, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,5 9 endorsed the copyright misuse doctrine and implicitly
linked the doctrine to an antitrust standard.6 Perhaps a more accurate
assessment of BMI v. CBS is that the Supreme Court only implicitly accepted
the copyright misuse doctrine.61 In BMI v. CBS, the Court faced a situation
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
found that Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of
Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP) had misused their copyrights
through the use of blanket licenses.6 2 BMI v. CBS, though, was a private
antitrust action rather than an infringement action.63 Columbia Broadcasting
System (CBS) did not raise misuse as a defense.64 Instead, CBS, in addition
to its antitrust claim, sought a declaratory judgment that BMI and ASCAP
misused their copyrights. 65 The court of appeals found that the blanket
licenses of BMI and ASCAP constituted per se price fixing and further
concluded that the per se price fixing constituted misuse of copyright."
54. United States v. Loew's Inc, 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962).
55. Id. at 46 (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), and
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)); see supra notes 18-27 and
accompanying text (discussing Morton Salt).
56. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. at 50.
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 52.
59. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
60. See Note, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: The
Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 15 NEw ENG. L. Rav. 683, 684 (1980) (asserting that Supreme
Court endorsed copyright misuse doctrine in BMI v. CBS based on antitrust standard).
61. See Susman, supra note 15, at 306 (stating that Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS
implicitly may have recognized copyright misuse defense).
62. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 6 & n.9 (1979).
The Supreme Court in CBS v. BMI defined blanket licenses as licenses "which give the
licensees the right to perform any and all of the compositions owned by the members or
affiliates [of BMI or ASCAP] as often as the licensees desire for a stated term." Id. at 5.
BMI and ASCAP ordinarily offer blanket licenses for either a flat fee or a percentage of a
licensee's total revenue without direct regard for the amount of music the licensees actually
perform. Id.
63. Id. at 6.
64. Id. at 6 n.7.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6-7, & 7 n.9.
19921
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Thus, when the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the court of appeals'
determination that the blanket licensing was per se price fixing, the Court
reversed and remanded the misuse determination as well. 67 By reversing the
per se antitrust determination and the dependent judgment of misuse, the
Court in BMI v. CBS implicitly may have accepted copyright misuse.6 The
Supreme Court's action is significant in that the Court did not accept
explicitly the doctrine of copyright misuse.69 The Court noted that the
Second Circuit undoubtedly based the Second Circuit's finding of misuse
on the finding of unlawful price fixing.70 Because the Supreme Court found
that the price fixing was not a per se antitrust violation, the Second Circuit's
basis for the finding of misuse disappeared.7 1 The Supreme Court, however,
did not engage in an independent analysis of the copyright misuse issue,
nor did the Court explicitly find that an antitrust violation was a prerequisite
to a finding of copyright misuse.7 2 The Court's reversal of the copyright
misuse issue may imply that the Court recognizes the theory of copyright
misuse.
73
In the absence of a Supreme Court opinion explicitly treating the issue
of copyright misuse, only one court before Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds actually had applied a copyright misuse defense to bar an in-
fringement claim. In M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen,74 a district court case
often cited in discussions of a copyright misuse defense, 75 the plaintiffs,
members ASCAP, sued certain movie theaters for allegedly infringing the
67. Id. at 24.
68. See Susman, supra note 15, at 306 (noting that Supreme Court, by reversing and
remanding per se antitrust judgment and dependent copyright misuse judgment in BMI v.
CBS, implicitly may have accepted copyright misuse defense); Note, supra note 60, at 693
(suggesting that Supreme Court's failure expressly to consider copyright misuse issue indicated
that Supreme Court endorsed theory of copyright misuse).
69. See BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. at 6 n.9, 24 (finding licensing practices not to be per se
antitrust violations and, thus, reversing judgment of price fixing and dependent judgment of
copyright misuse). After engaging in an extensive analysis of the antitrust issue regarding price
fixing, the Supreme Court, in BMI v. CBS, dealt with the copyright misuse issue simply by
referring to an earlier footnote in the Supreme Court opinion in which the Court noted that
the Second Circuit had based the copyright misuse judgment solely on the finding of unlawful
price fixing. Id.
70. Id. at 6 n.9.
71. Id. at 24.
72. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 n.17 (4th Cir. 1990)
(noting that Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS did not determine that finding of copyright misuse
must depend on finding of antitrust violation).
73. See Susman, supra note 15, at 306 (asserting that Supreme Court's treatment of
copyright misuse in BMI v. CBS may be implicit acceptance of copyright misuse defense).
74. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
75. See, e.g., Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (citing Jensen); United Artists Associated v.
NWL Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953, 958 (S.D.N.Y 1961) (same); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd., 506
F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
LASERCOMB AMERICA, INC. V. REYNOLDS
plaintiff's copyrights.7 6 The movie theaters showed ASCAP material to the
public without obtaining a license from ASCAP.77 The movie theaters
asserted that the plaintiffs illegally had extended plaintiffs' copyrights and
violated the antitrust laws by offering only blanket licenses .7  The United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota found that the plaintiffs
had violated the antitrust laws.7 9 Because the plaintiffs had extended their
copyright monopoly beyond the scope of the grant, the district court denied
plaintiffs recovery in their infringement actiof.80 The Jensen court reasoned
that the plaintiffs had tied some copyrighted music with other copyrighted
music through the blanket licensing and, thus, had extended their copyright
monopoly.8' In reaching this conclusion, the Jensen court cited Paramount
Pictures2 to support the monopoly extension theory. 3 The Jensen court,
however, declined to decide whether an antitrust violation alone would bar
the plaintiff's infringement action. 4
Some courts have recognized the existence or possible existence of the
copyright misuse defense during early stages of litigation without actually
applying the doctrine to bar an infringement action.85 For example, in
United Artists Associated, Inc. v. NWL Corp. ,86 the plaintiff, United Artists
Associated, Inc. (United Artists), sued NWL Corp. (NWL) for allegedly
infringing the plaintiff's copyright and for engaging in unfair trade practices
by receiving the plaintiff's movies through television broadcast, reproducing,
and distributing these movies for a fee.87 United Artists moved to strike
76. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 844 (D. Minn. 1948).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 844-45. In Jensen the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
explained that, to show a film, a theater must obtain the performance rights to any material
under copyright that is included in the film. Id. According to the Jensen court, "blanket
licensing" refers to ASCAP's licensing practice of granting to each theater owner one license
that covers the performance rights to all ASCAP material. Id. at 845. The theaters contended
that they did not have the opportunity to deal with individual copyright owners as to particular
music. Id. Instead, the theaters had to obtain a blanket license from ASCAP. Id.
79. Id. at 849.
80. Id. at 847-848. The Jensen court reasoned that the plaintiffs had extended their
copyright monopoly by "[tying] their copyrights with other copyrighted music and thus have
shared in the rewards which are obtained from other copyrighted material." Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see supra notes 45-
52 and accompanying text (discussing Paramount Pictures).
83. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. at 848.
84. Id. at 850.
85. See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
mentioned or recognized, but did not apply, copyright misuse).
86. 198 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
87. United Artists Associated, Inc. v. NWL Corp., 198 F. Supp. 953, 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). In United Artists, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York considered the plaintiff's motion to strike the affirmative defense of copyright misuse
from the defendant's answer. Id. United Artists argued that the defense was legally insufficient
because a misuse or antitrust violation is not a permissible defense in an infringement action
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:213
NWL's copyright misuse defense on the ground that the defense was legally
insufficient. 88 The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that the availability of a misuse defense was a "disputed
and substantial" question of law and denied United Artists' motion to
strike the copyright misuse defense. 89 The United Artists court concluded
that a complete hearing was necessary to determine the sufficiency of the
copyright misuse defense. 90 More recently, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Services,9' Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
and other plaintiffs sued defendants for copyright infringement.9 2 The
defendants responded with defenses and counterclaims attacking BMI's use
of blanket licenses. 93 BMI moved to strike these defenses and counterclaims,
including defendant's affirmative defense of copyright misuse.9 Noting that
some courts have rejected the copyright misuse doctrine and that other
courts have recognized but declined to apply the doctrine due to the facts
of a particular case, 95 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York recognized copyright misuse as a "cognizable" defense
and denied the plaintiff's motion to strike.
96
In some cases, the courts evidently determined that a finding of misuse
rests on the existence of an antitrust violation. 97 For example, in United
if the alleged misconduct is not directly connected to the controversy, if the alleged misconduct
has not prejudiced the defendant, and if a grant of relief to the plaintiff would not contribute
to a misuse. Id. at 957. The court examined patent and copyright misuse cases and concluded
that the issue of the availability of the misuse defense in copyright misuse cases can be resolved
only after a hearing. Id. at 959. Accordingly, the United Artists court denied the motion to
strike. Id.
88. Id. at 955.
89. Id. at 959.
90. Id.
91. 746 F. Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
92. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp.
320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
93. Id. at 325.
94. Id. at 323. In Hearst/ABC, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss an antitrust and copyright
misuse counterclaim and moved to strike a copyright misuse defense. Id. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion regarding the antitrust
portion of the counterclaim. Id. at 326. The court also denied plaintiff's motion to strike the
affirmative defense of misuse. Id. at 328. The court, however, granted the motion to dismiss
the misuse counterclaim. Id. In denying the motion to strike the misuse defense, the court
noted that few courts had recognized the doctrine, while some had even completely rejected
the doctrine. Id. at 327-28. Nonetheless, the court accepted copyright misuse as a "cognizable"
defense on the basis of recent cases that recognized, but did not apply, the defense. Id. at
328. The court, in dismissing the misuse counterclaim, described the use of the theory of
misuse for affirmative relief as "unprecedented." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Coleman v. ESPN, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing
Hearst/ABC in refusing to grant summary judgment motion dismissing copyright misuse
defense).
97. See Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing,
Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply copyright misuse in absence of
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Telephone Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co.9 the plaintiff, United Telephone
Company of Missouri (United Telephone), brought an action for copyright
infringement against the defendant, Johnson Publishing Company, Inc.
(Johnson).9 United Telephone alleged that Johnson violated United Tele-
phone's copyright when Johnson used United Telephone's phone book in
order to obtain new listings for Johnson's own phone book.?' Johnson
asserted in response that United Telephone misused the copyright by creating
a monopoly in the names of subscribers.10' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit assumed that the copyright misuse doctrine
could bar relief if the infringer established misuse on the part of the
copyright owner.1 2 In making this assumption, the court referred to two
cases in which the issue of copyright misuse arose.'03 The United Telephone
court first relied on the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop104 In
F.E.L. Publications, the Seventh Circuit indicated that a misuse amounting
to an antitrust violation may be an available defense in an infringement
action.' 05 The United Telephone court then referred to Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc.,' °6 where the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's application of
the copyright misuse doctrine by stating that, if an antitrust violation is a
defense, the facts did not support such a finding107 Applying F.E.L.
Publications and Edward B. Marks, the United Telephone court determined
antitrust violation); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Grant's Cabin, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 633, 634-35
(E.D. Mo. 1979) (striking affirmative defense where plaintiffs relied on allegations of antitrust
violations to support theory of misuse, but finding no antitrust violation); infra notes 98-115
and accompanying text (discussing other cases in which courts determined that finding of
copyright misuse required presence of antitrust violation).
98. 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
99. United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 605 (8th Cir. 1988).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 612.
103. See id. at 611 (citing F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 506 F. Supp.
1127 (N. D. Il. 1981), rev'd, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859
(1982); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Okla. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975)).
104. See United Tel., 855 F.2d at 611 (reading Seventh Circuit's opinion in F.E.L.
Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 413-16 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 506 F.
Supp. 1127 (N.D. Il1. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982), as accepting copyright misuse
as available defense in proper circumstances).
105. F.E.L. Publications, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409, 413 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982); see United Telephone,
855 F.2d at 611 (interpreting Seventh Circuit's opinion in F.E.L. Publications as accepting
that misuse that amounts to antitrust violation may constitute defense in infringement action).
106. 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974).
107. See United Tel., 855 F.2d at 611-12 (noting that court in Edward B. Marks Music
Corp., 497 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975), held that, if copyright
misuse defense is available, defendant failed to show conduct on part of plaintiff to support
application of defense).
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that the copyright owner's activities in the instant case did not violate the
antitrust laws and, thus, did not constitute a misuse. 108
In another example of a court applying an antitrust standard to copy-
right misuse, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,
in Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co.,'09 encountered the
issue of whether a defendant telephone company had misused its white
pages directory in a manner violative of copyright law. In Hutchinson, two
companies produced competing telephone directories. 110 The plaintiff, Hutch-
inson Telephone Company (Hutchinson), claimed that the defendant, Fron-
teer Directory Company (Fronteer), infringed Hutchinson's copyright in
Hutchinson's white page listings when Fronteer used those listings to produce
a directory."' Fronteer claimed in defense that Hutchinson violated the
antitrust laws when Hutchinson refused to allow Fronteer access to Hutch-
inson's white pages and used the white page listings to control the market
in yellow page listings.1 2 Fronteer also raised the defense of copyright
misuse."' The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
determined that Hutchinson did not violate the antitrust laws because
Hutchinson did not conspire to -restrain trade, nor did Hutchinson possess
specific intent to destroy competition. 1 4 With little analysis of the copyright
misuse issue, the Hutchinson court found that, because Hutchinson had not
violated the antitrust laws, Hutchinson had not misused its copyright." 5
Courts also outwardly have rejected the copyright misuse defense. For
example, in Rural Telephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc.," 6 a
telephone directory case similar to Hutchinson, the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas refused to recognize copyright misuse as
a defense."l7 A central issue in Rural Telephone was whether the defendant,
108. United Telephone, 855 F.2d at 612.
109. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1968 (D. Minn. 1987).
110. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1968, 1969 (D. Minn.
1987).
Ill. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), resolved the threshold issue of whether a telephone company has a
protected copyright interest in white page listings. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying
text (discussing Rural Telephone and indicating that white page listings that are devoid of
originality do not receive copyright protection).
112. Hutchinson, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1969. In Hutchinson, Fronteer also claimed that
Hutchinson violated the antitrust laws by conspiring with GTE Directories Corp. to restrain
the yellow pages market. Id. at 1970.
113. Id. at 1969.
114. Id. at 1970-72.
115. Id. at 1972.
116. 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987).
117. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987),
aff'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). In Rural
Telephone, Rural Telephone Service Co. (Rural) sued Feist Publications Inc. (Feist) for
copyright infringement, alleging that Feist had copied white pages from Rural's 1982-1983
telephone directory. 663 F. Supp. at 216. As a defense, Feist asserted copyright misuse on the
basis of Rural's alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 219-20. The United States District Court
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Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist), a publisher of telephone directories, infringed
the copyright of Rural Telephone Service Co. (Rural) by using Rural's
directory to gather names for Feist's directory.'18 In Rural Telephone, the
alleged infringer, Feist, argued that the district court should extend the
patent misuse doctrine of Morton Salt to copyright actions.11 9 Feist argued
that Rural should not be allowed to assert rights of copyright 120 because
Rural violated federal antitrust laws.' 2' The district court rejected Feist's
argument, stating that lower courts generally had refused to recognize
antitrust violations as a defense to infringement. 22 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in
Rural Telephone."-3 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed, but the reversal
rested on the grounds that Rural did not have a protected interest in its
white pages.1u
Rural Telephone is indicative of the problem of courts linking the
analysis of copyright misuse with the analysis of antitrust violations. Courts
often fail to recognize that copyright misuse rests on a public policy of
preventing monopoly extension.'2 Given this failure to recognize the public
policy justification for preventing copyright misuse, a court's reliance on
for the District of Kansas, citing three district court cases for the proposition that antitrust
violations do not constitute a defense to copyright infringement actions, refused to adapt the
theory embodied in patent misuse to the copyright law. See id. at 220 (citing Orth-O-Vision,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House
Enters., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1958)). The Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, affirmed the lower court's determination that an antitrust violation is not a defense
to a copyright infringement suit. Rural Telephone, 916 F.2d 718.
118. See Rural Telephone, 663 F. Supp. at 217.
119. Id. at 219.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (identifying five exclusive rights that copyright grant
confers upon copyright owner).
121. Rural Telephone, 663 F. Supp. at 220.
122. Id.
123. See Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990);
rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
124. Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1991). According
to the Supreme Court, the intent of copyright is to reward originality rather than effort. Id.
The Court noted that, "[blecause Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use
of the listings cannot constitute infringement. Id.
125. See Gibbs, supra note 15, at 36 (noting confusion caused by failure to understand
how policy rationale behind copyright misuse differs from policy rationale behind antitrust
law). According to Gibbs, the confusion over copyright misuse stems from courts, like the
district court in Rural Telephone, that link copyright misuse with antitrust. Gibbs explains:
The failure to understand this teaching of the patent cases, that refusal to entertain
an action for infringement is based upon the policy against conduct 'expanding the
patent beyond the legitimate scope of its monopoly,' not upon a policy of denying
relief to one who violates the antitrust laws, has been the source of the confusion
over copyright misuse.
Id. (quoting Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944)); see also
Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 933 F.2d
952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991) (characterizing defense as "antitrust misuse defense").
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antitrust principles may be inappropriate. The reason for applying the
copyright misuse defense is to insure that the public policy prevails. 126 This
policy entails more than the. anticompetitive effects to which the antitrust
laws respond. 27 If a copyright owner engages in conduct that deprives the
public of a benefit due the public under the copyright laws, then that
conduct should amount to a misuse regardless of the conduct's anticom-
petitive effect.'2 Unfortunately, many courts that have dealt with the issue
of copyright misuse have engaged only in antitrust analysis, with widely
differing results.
2 9
Despite the conflicting opinions regarding the existence and application
of the copyright misuse doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit recognized and applied the copyright misuse defense in
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds.'"° In Lasercomb the plaintiff, Las-
ercomb America, Inc. (Lasercomb), who held the copyright to a computer
software program, alleged that the defendants, Holiday Steel Rule Die Corp.
(Holiday Steel), its president and sole shareholder, Larry Holliday, and a
computer programmer for Holiday Steel, Job Reynolds, had illegally copied
Lasercomb's copyrighted software thus infringing on Lasercomb's copy-
right.'' Both Lasercomb and Holiday Steel produced steel rule dies used to
manufacture cardboard boxes and cartons.3 2 To aid in the making of these
steel rule dies, Lasercomb developed a computer program called Interact,
and, subsequently, licensed four copies of Interact to Holiday Steel.'"
Holiday Steel, without authorization, however, made three additional copies
of Interact. Subsequently, Holliday directed Reynolds to develop a software
program that was virtually a direct copy of Interact.' 4 The United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found that the
defendants infringed Lasercomb's copyright. 3 On appeal, Holliday and
Reynolds did not dispute that they copied Interact. 3 6 Instead, .Holliday and
Reynolds asserted copyright misuse as an affirmative defense to Lasercomb's
infringement action.' 37 Holliday and Reynolds argued that through anticom-
126. See infra notes 179-183 and accompanying text (discussing public policy concerns
upon which copyright misuse defense is based).
127. See Note, Copyright Self-Help Protection as Copyright Misuse: Finally, the Other
Shoe Drops, 57 UMKC L. Rv. 899, 901 (1989) (explaining that anticompetitive effects often
do not accompany copyright misuse).
128. See id. at 914-15 (asserting that copyright owners who misuse copyright may deprive
public of benefits due public-under copyright law while such misuse may not produce
anticompetitive effect on marketplace).
129. See supra notes 74-124 and accompanying text (discussing various conclusions courts
have reached on existence and applicability of copyright misuse defense).
130. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
131. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1990).
132. Id. at 971.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 970, 972.
136. Id. at 972.
137. Id.
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petitive language in the licensing agreement,' Lasercomb, as the copyright
owner, restricted licensees from creating software of a similar nature and
that such a restriction constituted copyright misuse. 13 9
Engaging in an historical analysis of intellectual property generally and
the doctrines of patent and copyright misuse specifically,' 40 the Fourth
Circuit initially noted the similarities between the development and policies
of the patent and copyright laws of England. 141 According to the Lasercomb
court, the English Crown granted patents, which allowed for a limited
monopoly to inventors, to encourage the creation of inventions. 14 Similarly,
to encourage authors to express new ideas, the English Crown granted
publication rights to authors for a certain number of years. 43 The Fourth
Circuit then concluded that the framers of the United States Constitution
had considered the concepts of patent and copyright as similar enough in
purpose'44 to include these concepts together in Article I, section 8, clause
8 of the Constitution. 4 The court next noted that the Supreme Court has
recognized that both patent policy and copyright policy are designed to
achieve progress by encouraging inventors and authors.' 46 Following this
comparison of patent and copyright policy, the Lasercomb court discussed
the misuse of patent defense by referring to the "foundational patent misuse
138. Id. at 973. In Lasercomb, the anticompetitive language in the licensing agreement
read as follows:
D. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement that it will not permit or
suffer its directors, officers and employees, directly or indirectly, to write, develop,
produce or sell computer assisted die making software.
E. Licensee agrees during the term of this Agreement and for one (1) year after the
termination of this agreement, that it will not write, develop, produce or sell or
assist others in the writing, developing, producing or selling computer assisted die
making software, directly or indirectly without Lasercomb's prior written consent.
Any such activity undertaken without Lasercomb's written consent shall nullify any
warranties or agreements of Lasercomb set forth herein.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 974-76.
141. Id. at 974.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 975.
144. Id.
145. Id. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides that "[the Congress
shall have Power] to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975. As support for the conclusion that patent and copyright
policy both are designed to achieve progress, the Lasercomb court quoted Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954):
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975.
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:213
case" of Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. 47 The Lasercomb court
also acknowledged congressional recognition of patent misuse in the 1988
Patent Misuse Reform Act.
48
After noting the wide recognition of patent misuse, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a similar misuse doctrine exists for copyright. 149 The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged that only the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota in M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen actually had
barred a plaintiff's infringement action solely because of the plaintiff's
misuse of copyright. 150 The Lasercomb court, however, also mentioned that
other courts had expressed the view that the Morton Salt rationale'5' could
be applicable in the context of copyright. 52 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that the misuse defense should be available in copyright as well as patent
because of the "parallel public interests" that copyright and patent serve.'
5'
In reaching this conclusion, the Lasercomb court underscored the similarity
between patent policy and copyright policy by adapting part of the Morton
Salt patent analysis to copyright simply by substituting copyright terms for
patent terms.
154
After determining that the copyright misuse doctrine existed, the Las-
ercomb court applied the misuse doctrine to the case at bar. The Lasercomb
court compared the anticompetitive language of the licensing agreement 55
with similar anticompetitive language found in Compton v. Metal Products,
Inc. ' 156 a patent case in which the Fourth Circuit barred a plaintiff's
infringement action because that plaintiff had misused its patent. 57 The
147. 314 U.S 488 (1942). See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 975-76 (discussing Morton Salt).
148. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. See Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703,
102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) & (5).
149. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976-77.
150. Id. at 976; see supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (discussing Jensen).
151. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's decision
in Morton Salt).
152. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 n.16. In Lasercomb the Fourth Circuit noted that at
least one other circuit had expressed the opinion that the public monopoly extension rationale
of Morton Salt was applicable to copyright. Id. (citing Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema
Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 n.27 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)).
153. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
154. Id. at 977. The Lasercomb court adapted the Morton Salt patent analysis as follows:
The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright] carries out a public
policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors] ...
the exclusive Right . . ." to their ["original" works]. United States Constitution,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, [17 U.S.C.A. § 1021. But the public policy which includes [original
works] within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in the
[original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an
exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which
it is contrary to public policy to grant.
Id. (emphasis on adaptation and ellipses in original).
155. See supra note 138 (quoting anticompetitive agreement in Lasercomb).
156. 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972).
157. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978-79. The Lasercomb court compared the anticompetitive
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Lasercomb court determined that the anticompetitive language of the license
agreement in Lasercomb was as "egregious" as the anticompetitive language
found to bar the plaintiff's infringement action in Compton.'58 The Laser-
comb court noted that a copyright confers a privilege to the author because
the copyright grants that author certain rights in the expression of an idea.159
However, as the Lasercomb court recognized, a copyright does not protect
the idea itself. 6 Thus, the court reasoned that, while Lasercomb could
restrict the copying of Interact, Lasercomb could not restrict the independent
development of software that might compete with Interact.16' Because Las-
ercomb had attempted to restrict competition outside the copyright, Laser-
comb lost its right to assert its copyright against an infringer. 62
Despite the Lasercomb court's resolution of the existence of a copyright
misuse defense in an infringement action, the question of what constitutes
copyright misuse remains. In analyzing the development of the patent misuse
doctrine and the limited recognition of the copyright misuse doctrine, courts
might apply an antitrust standard to determine whether a copyright owner
has misused its copyright. 63 One commentator, in arguing for an antitrust
standard in the copyright misuse doctrine, noted that a court may deem a
patent owner to have misused his patent in a tying arrangement'64 only if
that patent owner possessed "market power" as required by the patent act,
35 U.S.C. section 271(d)(5).1 65 The commentator then extended this require-
language in Lasercomb's licensing agreement with the anticompetitive language of a licensing
agreement from a patent misuse case, Compton v. Metal Products, Inc., 453 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.
1971). An issue in Compton was whether the plaintiff, Compton, had misused its patent.
Compton, 453 F.2d at 44. Through a non-competition clause in the licensing agreement,
Compton restricted itself in competing Nrith others. Id. at 44. The language of the agreement
read:
During any period for which he is entitled to royalties hereunder Compton shall not
without Joy's prior consent engage in any business or activity relating to the
manufacture or sale of equipment of the type licensed hereunder, or have any
affiliation financial or otherwise with, or give any advice, counsel or assistance to,
any other person, firm, company, or entity directly or indirectly engaged in the
manufacture or sale of such equipment.
Id. According to the Compton court, Compton could not demand such a restriction from
others. Id. at 45. Therefore, the Compton court reasoned that Compton could not agree to
restrict itself in such a manner either, because such a restriction would deprive the public of
the benefits of competition. Id. The Compton court, in finding the non-competition agreement
to be a patent misuse, emphasized the public's interest in free competition. Id.
158. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979.
159. Id. at 978 n.19.
160. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (1988) (stating that copyright protects expression but
not idea); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (same).
161. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
162. Id.
163. See Susman, supra note 15, at 322 (arguing that court should only find copyright
misuse if copyright owner has violated antitrust law).
164. See supra note 30 (defining tying arrangement).
165. Susman, supra note 15, at 319. Susman refers to the legislative history of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(5) and notes that the market power requirement is to be guided by antitrust principles.
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ment to the copyright field, arguing that the possession of market power
should be a primary factor in determining whether a tying arrangement in
the copyright context amounts to a misuse.'6 According to the commentator,
statutory patent misuse law should extend to copyright law because courts
derived the doctrine of copyright misuse from the doctrine of patent
misuse. 67 In determining market power in the patent context under section
271(d)(5), courts likely will look to antitrust principles.' 6 Because antitrust
principles will guide the courts in determining market power in the patent
context, the commentator argued that an antitrust standard should also
guide the courts in determining market power in a tying arrangement
involving copyrights. 16 9 However, the commentator further asserted that
courts will likely apply an antitrust standard to patent misuse generally.'
70
In other words, the commentator asserted that courts will only find patent
misuse when a patent owner has violated the antitrust laws through the use
of the patent.'7 ' According to the commentator, the courts likewise should
apply such a straight antitrust standard in determining copyright misuse.
7 2
Moreover, another commentator also has asserted the beneficial aspects
of applying an antitrust standard to determine copyright misuse.17  For
instance, the antitrust standard would be much clearer in application.
74
Because statutory law embodies and supports the antitrust principles, these
statutory antitrust principles seemingly are clearer than the public policy
Id. at 319-20; see also H. HOVNK.cMP, ECONOMICS & FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 55 (1985)
(defining market power in context of antitrust). According to Hovenkamp, "[miarket power
is the ability of a firm to increase its profits by reducing output and charging more than a
competitive price for its product." HoVENKAMP, supra, at 55.
166. Susman, supra note 15, at 322.
167. Id. at 322. Susman noted that the Supreme Court, in the cases that implicitly support
a copyright misuse doctrine, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1947),
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), and Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), asserted that the patent principles regarding tying
arrangements also applied to copyrights. Susman, supra note 15, at 321 & n.107. Thus, the
courts derived copyright misuse doctrine from patent misuse doctrine. Id. at 322; see supra
note 17 and accompanying text (noting that copyright misuse defense finds support in patent
misuse doctrine).
168. See Susman, supra note 15, at 319-320 (noting Senator Leahy's comment during
debate on 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5), 134 CONG. Rtc. S17148 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988), that
determination of market power in patent misuse context would rest on same standards as
similar determination in antitrust context).
169. Susman, supra note 15, at 321-22.
170. Id. at 322.
171. See id. (asserting that courts likely will take straight antitrust approach to patent
misuse).
172. Id. at 322.
173. See Note, supra note 15, at 1314 (stating that courts should incorporate antitrust
standard into copyright misuse doctrine to ensure that only antitrust violation that is directly
connected to copyright in question will constitute misuse).
174. See id. at 1312 (describing public policy standard as vague and open-ended and
asserting that antitrust standard is better suited to determining copyright misuse).
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standard of copyright monopoly extension.17 5 Furthermore, application of
an antitrust standard would make it easier for copyright owners to gauge
individual conduct by ensuring that, in the absence of antitrust violations,
a court could not find that a copyright owner misused the copyright.
76
With the public policy standard guiding copyright misuse, though, copyright
owners are less able to define their own rights.
77
The Lasercomb court, however, clearly did not apply an antitrust
standard in holding that Lasercomb misused its copyright. 78 Instead, the
Fourth Circuit stated that the principal issue in determining whether a
copyright owner has misused its copyright is whether the copyright owner
has used its copyright to subvert public policy. 7 9 Though the Lasercomb
approach perhaps is less clear than an antitrust approach, the underlying
theory of the copyright misuse defense supports the Lasercomb approach. 80
The government grants copyrights to encourage authors to contribute the
authors' works to society."8 ' In return for this contribution, the authors
receive certain privileges over their works for alimited time. 8 2 Notably, the
purpose of the copyright is to benefit society; the government achieves this
benefit by rewarding authors. 83 Thus, if a copyright owner has thwarted
the public policy goal of copyright, the courts should not enforce the
copyright in question.
The public policy rationale comes directly from the patent case of
Morton Salt1e4 However, as the patent misuse doctrine has developed, an
antitrust analysis has become intertwined with the patent misuse doctrine.
85
In fact, section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act requires a rule-of-reason-type
analysis to determine whether a tying arrangement constitutes patent misuse,
thus underscoring the link between antitrust theory and the patent misuse
doctrine.8 6 Antitrust analysis, however, does not adapt as easily to copyright
175. See id. at 1311 (noting that uniform application of public policy standard is extremely
complicated and asserting that courts should turn to substantive antitrust principles in deter-
mining copyright misuse).
176. See id. (suggesting that antitrust standard for determining copyright misuse would
be certain in application, thus avoiding vagueness of public policy standard).
177. See id. (stating that public policy standard is "ill-defined").
178. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 126-129 (discussing underlying theory of copyright misuse defense).
181. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that
copyright is granted to benefit society by encouraging authors to contribute works to society);
supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing public policy of copyright).
182. See 17 U.S.C. 106(1)-(S) (1988) (listing authors' exclusive rights under copyright law).
183. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158.
184. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (discussing public
policy of patent in Morton Salt).
185. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510-512 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983) (discussing doctrine of patent misuse and indicating that
antitrust principles are basis for analysis of patent misuse).
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1988) (defining analysis required before determination
that tying arrangement constitutes patent misuse); supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text
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law as it does to patent law. 8 7 Though the policies of patent and copyright
are similar, the actual grants of each are different.' A patent grants a
patent owner virtually complete control over the owner's invention, whereas
a copyright gives a copyright owner only limited control through five
exclusive rights. 1 9 Also, a patent protects an inventor's idea; a copyright
protects only an author's expression of an idea. 90 Thus, in copyright, many
expressions of the same or similar idea may be available on the market,
making the copyrighted material more substitutable.' 91 Because a patent
confers so much control over the patented item, misuse of a patent more
likely results in an anticompetitive effect. 192
In contrast, because a copyright confers substantially less than a patent,
a copyright owner is less likely to produce an anticompetitive effect through
misuse. 93 Despite this lesser potential for causing anticompetitive harm, a
copyright owner's misuse still may subvert the public policy embodied in
the copyright. ' 9 4 For example, one commentator asserted that, through the
use of certain devices or techniques to prohibit the reproduction of copy-
righted material, a copyright owner potentially has misused its copyright. 95
(discussing § 271(d)(5) rule-of-reason analysis); Susman, supra note 15, at 319-320 (indicating
that, in determining patent misuse, courts consider tying arrangements under rule-of-reason
analysis).
187. See Note, supra note 127, at 901 (explaining that finding of antitrust violation
requires finding of anticompetitive effect, and explaining further that misuse of copyright is
not likely to create such anticompetitive effect).
188. See id. at 904 (noting that patent grants protection to idea whereas copyright grants
protection only to expression of idea).
189. See 17 U.S.C. 106(l)-(5) (1988) (listing authors' exclusive rights under copyright).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (asserting that copyright protection does not extend
to idea); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (stating that copyright provides
protection for expression of idea rather than idea itself); Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970, 978 n.19 (citing Mazer for proposition that copyright protection extends to
expression of idea rather than idea itself).
191. See Note, supra note 127, at 904 (noting that copyrighted works are highly substi-
tutable).
192. See id. at 901 (noting likelihood of patent misuse to produce anticompetitive effect).
193. See id. at 903-04 (noting that, because multiple expressions of one idea may exist in
market, copyright owner's misuse likely will not produce anticompetitive effect).
194. See id. at 914 (stating that copyright misuse deprives public of benefits due public
under copyright grant).
195. Id. at 910-914. The commentator asserts as an example a situation in which some
video equipment manufacturers have devised a process to prevent the copying of videotapes.
Id. at 912. The copy prevention technique simply is the method used to prevent the copying
of a video. Id. Of course, the reason to institute copy prevention techniques is to protect
video works from counterfeiters and from consumers who attempt to copy video rentals. Id.
at 913. However, such copy prevention techniques are permanent. Id. The result is that the
public also is prevented from making "fair use" copies, such as when a library makes a legal
copy of a video for the purpose of protecting its collection. Id. Though such a copyright
prevention technique likely will not produce an anticompetitive effect, the technique still
subverts the public policy and, thus, constitutes copyright misuse. Id. at 914.
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As this commentator argued, the use of copy prevention likely will outlive
the copyright grant. 19 Thus, when the material enters the public domain,
and the public has the right to reproduce the work, reproduction still may
be impossible.' 7 By producing works that cannot be copied, the copyright
owner has subverted public policy and, thus, has misused its copyright. 19
However, because the copy prevention technique would not produce an
anticompetitive harm, a court applying an antitrust standard to copyright
misuse would not find that the copyright owner misused its copyright. 19
Given this inequitable result, courts should adopt a public policy "monopoly
extension" standard rather than an antitrust standard in determining whether
a copyright owner has misused its copyright.
200
Though direct support for the copyright misuse doctrine in the case law
is sparse,20' the Lasercomb court correctly recognized a copyright misuse
defense for the following reasons. First, the policy rationale for granting
patents and copyrights basically is the same because both patents and
copyrights further a policy of encouraging inventors and authors to con-
tribute to society."2 Second, the Supreme Court has utilized patent misuse
cases to support reasoning in antitrust cases involving copyright. 203 Third,
a copyright confers only limited rights in the expression of an idea.204 If a
copyright owner subverts public policy by extending the limited monopoly
beyond the intended scope of the copyright, courts should bar that copyright
owner from asserting the owner's rights conferred by the copyright in
court. 25 Though the Supreme Court never expressly has formulated a
copyright misuse doctrine, the Supreme Court's patent misuse doctrine,2°1
coupled with the Court's recognition of the similarities in patent and
copyright,2 indicates that the copyright misuse doctrine exists. 208 Although
196. See id. at 913-914 (explaining that method of copyright protection is permanent and
prevents copying even after copyright period expires).
197. Id. at 914.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 914.
200. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (introducing monopoly extension
standard).
201. See supra notes 45-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases that implicitly or
explicitly support copyright misuse doctrine).
202. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that policy in granting patents
and copyrights is to encourage individual contribution to society in order to advance public
welfare).
203. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (discussing Paramount Pictures and
Loew's).
204. See 17 U.S.C. 106(l)-(5) (1988) (defining exclusive rights conferred by copyright).
205. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (introducing monopoly extension
theory).
206. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discussing patent misuse doctrine of
Morton Salt).
207. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting policy similarities between
patent and copyright); supra note 146 (indicating Lasercomb court's quotation of Mazer).
208. See supra notes 145, 153 and accompanying text (noting Lasercomb court's discussion
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several courts have disallowed the copyright misuse defense because the
plaintiffs had not violated the antitrust laws, 209 the Fourth Circuit correctly
concluded that a misuse does not have to be a violation of antitrust law to
suffice as an equitable defense to an infringement action.210 Relying heavily
upon the existence of a similar doctrine in patent law as developed in
Morton Salt,21 1 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that in patent law, a court may
find that a plaintiff misused the plaintiff's patent but did not violate the
antitrust laws.
212
Given that the policy concerns in patent law and in copyright law are
analogous, the issue remains whether a misuse doctrine, as it has been
developed and codified in patent law, should be adopted for use in copyright
law, or whether, as the Fourth Circuit suggests, an unrefined copyright
misuse doctrine should be recognized. In the absence of a congressionally
mandated standard for copyright misuse, the Lasercomb court, guided by
the policy concerns of copyright, adopted the proper approach to misuse
by recognizing a misuse standard that courts should apply whenever a
plaintiff has extended his copyright. 213 Though the concept of "extension"
is vague, 214 the copyright law, to be effective, must require that courts
determine misuse through a public policy "extension" standard.
21s
The similar policy concerns of patent and copyright support recognition
of a copyright misuse defense. 216 The scope of this defense, however, should
not be limited either by an antitrust standard or by the statutory development
of patent misuse. 2 7 Instead, the scope of the copyright misuse defense
should extend to the point where the copyright owner has extended the
copyright beyond the grant and, therefore, has subverted public policy.
2 s
208. See supra notes 145, 153 and accompanying text (noting Lasercomb court's discussion
of Supreme Court's comparison of patent and copyright, and also noting Lasercomb court's
application of Morton Salt rationale to copyright).
209. See notes 97-115 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts concluded
that finding of misuse must be supported by antitrust violation).
210. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990); see National
Cable Television Ass'n v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 652 (D.D.C 1991) (citing
Lasercomb for proposition that antitrust violation is not necessary to finding of copyright
misuse).
211. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
212. See D.S. CHisuM, supra note 36, at § 19.04 [2] (noting that antitrust violation will
constitute misuse but misuse does not have to be antitrust violation).
213. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (introducing monopoly extension
standard).
214. See D.S. CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 19.04 [2] (describing "extension" concept of
patent misuse as vague).
215. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text (discussing public policy monopoly
extension standard).
216. See supra note 140-46 and accompanying text (explaining basic similarity between
policy underlying patent and policy underlying copyright).
217. See supra notes 38-42, 185-200 and accompanying text (explaining that antitrust
standard is not suited to protect copyright policy, and discussing legislative history of patent
misuse which indicates that new patent misuse law should not affect copyright law).
218. See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)
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If Congress determines that this scope permits too broad a defense, then
Congress may codify a narrower standard as it did for patent law. This
legislative alternative of codifying copyright misuse is desirable because
codification would provide solid support for the copyright misuse doctrine
in addition to providing a uniform standard for its application. As one
commentator warned, if the legislature does not act, the courts, as in
Lasercomb, certainly will, 21 9 with the possible results of differing definitions
as to the scope of the defense and, perhaps, differing views on whether the
doctrine in fact exists.=
2
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(concluding that copyright owner misuses copyright by violating public policy embodied in
copyright).
219. See Susman, supra note 15, at 322 (noting that courts will shape copyright misuse
defense if Congress does not).
220. Compare Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 220 (D.
Kan 1987) (rejecting copyright misuse doctrine), aff'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Hearst/ABC Viacom
Entertainment Servs., 746 F. Supp. 320, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing that copyright
misuse defense may exist).
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